Greek Military Magazine Discusses Turkish Ballistic Missiles
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greek Military Magazine Discusses Turkish Ballistic Missiles
Project
GMP20020320000249 Athens Stratiyiki in Greek 01 Feb 02 pp 84-93
[Report by Thanasis Ghrammatikos: "Turkey's top-secret ballistic
missiles development project"]
In its 14 January 2002 issue, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet
(the online version @ www.milliyet.com.tr/2002/...un02.html)
featured a carefully worded article revealing that the first
testing of a Turkish-made ballistic missile had been successful.
The salient [Greek] government departments and the ministries
of Foreign Affairs and Defense have been aware for some time
now of this serious matter of which unfortunately there has
been been almost no mention in the Greek media.
This raises a host of questions (especially at the present
juncture) on the quality of information Greek citizens have
access to. This publication will attempt to throw some light
on this particularly complex issue (which brings to mind a spy
thriller) which, it would seem, topples the existing balances
in the region.
According to Milliyet's article, the "J missile," as it
is described, was the first to be manufactured in Turkey using
technology imported from China. All those witnessing the test
were reportedly impressed. The first test was held in late December
[2001] at the coastal area of Sile near Istanbul; the missile
was launched toward the Black Sea area. The aforementioned missile
is being "improved" since 1998, is a guided missile and has
a range of 150km. It has been likened to China's M-7 missile,
except for certain critical (kritik, in Turkish) technologies
(editor's note: evidently this refers to the guidance system).
The missile was manufactured at Roketsan's facilities in Ankara;
from now on, Turkey's armed forces will have the capability
of striking targets well behind enemy lines.
With the "J missile," Turkish armed forces will be capable
of destroying the enemy's missile launchers, military bases,
armored combat units and command centers. Depending on progress
achieved during production, the article went on, Turkey would
be increasing [the missile's] range. According to the Turkish
author's "sources," despite the fact that Turkey's neighboring
countries possessed huge missiles of 1000km range, it was not
Turkey's intention to exceed the highest permissible range of
300km as defined by international treaties. Evidently, the article
was aimed at reassuring countries in the region and at preempting
any reaction from international organizations.
But the truth of the matter, as will be revealed below,
is quite different and paints a grim picture of the future in
the region. It should be said that the recent Turkish test was
not an isolated action, rather it was part of wider strategic
planning, the ultimate goal of which is for Turkey to acquire
ballistic missiles of a range over 1,000km by 2004-2005. This
conclusion is not arbitrary, but is based on a classified recommendation
on the strategic goals of the Turkish armed forces that was
approved a few years ago by that country's all-powerful National
Security Council.
Especially disconcerting is the fact that, in contrast to
previous similar attempts, the United States has now given its
tacit acceptance; it is thought that US secret services know
in full detail what is going on. That would explain why new
facts and figures are constantly being publicized on the development
of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in "hostile"
countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya, but not
Turkey, where everything is hush-hush.
Background to Turkish attempts
Turkey's attempts at developing missile technology date
back several years. The venture began in the mid-1980s and was
in parallel with attempts at acquiring weapons of mass destruction,
which we shall analyze in our next issue. The main organization
charged with attaining these objectives is SAGE [Defense Industries
Research and Development Institute] of the Scientific and Technical
Research Council (TUBITAK), headquartered in Ankara. TUBITAK-SAGE
was founded in 1972, its objective being the development of
scientific research in the military sector for the benefit of
the armed forces and the domestic weapons industry.
In the 1970s, SAGE activities were limited due to insufficient
funds and lack of experience. The first serious attempts began
in the early 1980s with the foundation of departments and laboratories
of applied research on certain crucial areas relating to missile
technology. Today, these departments are: Department of Mechanics
and Systems, Chemicals and Propulsion Technologies, and the
Department of Electronics and Guidance & Control Technologies.
The Department of Mechanics and Systems has a Structural
Mechanics and Materials laboratory that carries out research
in linear and non-linear elastic structures, synthetic materials,
dynamics, conduction and heat transfer, etc. The External
Ballistics lab deals with aerodynamic design, behavioral analysis
of airborne objects (it has an aerodynamic chamber measuring
3.05 x 2.44 x 6.10m), etc. The Internal Ballistics and Tests
lab deals with internal ballistics issues, solid-fuel missile
engines and the design of solid-state propellants using software
developed in-house.
The Department of Chemicals and Propulsion Technologies
has a lab researching development of synthetic solid-state missile
propellants and their ballistic and mechanical attributes; the
Chemical Analysis lab carries out advanced chemical analyses
and specialized measurements on the attributes and performance
of various synthetic chemicals.
Finally, the Electronics and Guidance & Control Technologies
department has the required infrastructure for design, real-time
simulation and measurement of guidance & control systems and
of inertial guidance systems for aircraft and missiles. To this
end, it avails of a special test data bank, which also has calibration
and adjustment facilities for such systems.
To implement Turkey's ambitious goals, Roketsan A.S, was
founded in 1988; the corporation was charged with all activities
relating to the manufacture of rockets and guided missiles and
also the development (in cooperation with TUBITAK-SAGE) of missile
technology for the wider needs of the Turkish armed forces.
The corporation's initial share capital was $10.5 million. The
major shareholders were: private companies Kutlutas with a 20
percent stake, Sezai Turkes-Feyzi Akkaya with 20 percent, Kalekalip
with 15 percent, and state-owned corporations MKEK with 15 percent
and Aseisan also with 15 percent; the remaining 15 percent went
to TSKVG (Assistance to Armed Forces Council) [as published].
On 8 October 1991 Roketsan's new production facilities were
inaugurated; they comprised a total area of 27,000 square meters,
spread out across an expanse of 1,000 acres, in line with international
safety regulations. The new facilities are located in the Elmadag
area, near Ankara. Roketsan was staffed with dozens of scientists
and trained personnel totaling over 250 persons. Among these,
over 30 percent are mechanics. The premises' equipment includes
an advanced X-ray system used in non-destructive testing, structural
vibrations facilities, environmental controls and thermal shock
facilities.
Roketsan's activities include the production of missile
engines, rocket engines, launcher parts, missile assembly and
production of synthetic fuel propellants. Also active in the
area of missile technology are: the Kalekalip corporation (which
has a 15 percent stake in Roketsan), which manufactures and
assembles missile parts; and the state-owned MKEK weapons industry
with its MKEK-ELROKSAN factories based in Elmadag, the MKEK-CANSAS
factories based in Cankiri and the MKEK-MAKSAN facilities based
in Ankara.
All the above research and industrial units (together with
smaller units acting as sub-manufacturers) also participate
in the known program of development and construction of multiple
rocket launchers of different caliber (TR-107, T-122, TOROS,
etc.) and of the corresponding rockets. Turkey's first serious
attempt at acquiring missile technology came in 1988, through
an ambitious joint-production program with the United States
for the manufacture of 180 MLRS systems and 55,000 M26 combat
rockets. Turkey's outrageous (in the US view) demands concerning
transfer of technical know-how, coupled with the revelation
of Ankara's suspect plans, led the United States to terminate
the venture.
At the same time period, Turkey began its close cooperation
with Pakistan, which by then had significantly developed its
own program of HATF-1 and HATF-2 ballistic missiles (with a
range of 30 and 80km, respectively). With Pakistani aid, the
top-secret Turkish program of developing the ASR-227 missile
got under way in 1988; that program was based on the results
of Turkish research and on raw materials from Pakistan. Simultaneously,
Turkey attempted to again approach and appease the United States,
proposing the joint-production 1,000 ATACM missiles. Naturally
the United States turned down the offer, thereby giving Turkey
the excuse to seek new partners.
In 1989 Turkey first sounded out France, which diplomatically
denied offering technical know-how and comprehensive solutions.
But France agreed to sell Turkey state-of-the-art telemetry
and testing equipment, provided a Turkish international tender
would choose Thomson's TRS-22XX radar; the deal went through.
Meanwhile work got under way for the construction of a suitable
test area at the Sile coast near Istanbul. At around the same
time period the equipment from France began arriving; this was
first used in April 1990 during tests for the ASR-227 missile.
It is believed that the ASR-227 was assembled at the MKEK-ELROKSAN
facilities at Elmadag using both Turkish and Pakistani materials.
This alarmed the United States and Israel, which did not
look kindly on Turkey's partnership with Pakistan at a time
when Pakistan was intensifying its efforts to manufacture nuclear
weapons. In 1991 several Congressmen protested against Turkey's
proven involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program; this led to
strong pressure on Turkey to terminate its partnership with
Pakistan; the pressure paid off. This in turn meant Turkey again
needed to seek new partners, but these efforts were fruitless.
In 1991 an idea was put forward on continuing the project autonomously
with the assistance of thousands of scientists who were leaving
the crumbling Soviet Union in search of a better life.
In the second half of 1991 and early 1992, the Turkish secret
services recruited more than 200 Turkic-origin scientists and
experts on ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
Next began a new cycle of research programs at TUBITAK-SAGE
under the supervision of professors Haluk Aksel and Huseyn Vural;
this research was coupled by a necessary shift to Soviet technology.
But due to strict limitations arising from the implementation
of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) treaty, serious
problems came up with finding raw materials and also developing
the necessary computer software.
At the same time, it became known that a large quantity
of propellant fuels for ballistic missiles had been stolen;
the fuel had been stored in former Soviet republics of the Caucasus
region. In addition, gyroscopes, accelerometers and other critical
material went missing in mysterious circumstances; these components
came from the disassembling of ballistic missiles that were
withdrawn from countries of the former Soviet Union within the
framework of the implementation of the INF treaty. Investigations
by US and Russian secret services led to the Russian mafia which,
it turned out, had channeled the equipment to Turkish "businessmen"
(one of whom was the husband of former Turkish Minister Ciller)
and to Iraq.
In 1995 (?) [as published], with the help of the late general
Massoud, then commander of the Northern Alliance, a SCUD-8 missile
launcher from Afghan reserves was transferred [to Turkey?] via
Pakistan, for an unknown price. The aim was to attempt reverse
engineering and also to use the vehicle for testing purposes.
This attempt too ended in failure due to American and Russian
intervention. But the same did not hold true for a Multiple
Rocket Launcher development program going on at the same time
period; in September 1995 the prototypes of three systems in
production or at the final stage of development were put on
display for the first time at the IDEF exhibition.
Meanwhile, using the pretext that Turkey faced a threat
from the ballistic missiles of neighboring countries such as
Iraq, Iran and Syria, another attempt was made at developing
and building ballistic missiles. To this end, international
tenders were submitted to the United States, France, China and
Israel; only China and Israel responded. Secret negotiations
immediately got under way, and these resulted in the selection
of the Chinese offer, which was considered the best. The initial
reaction by the United States was lukewarm, but any reaction
fizzled out with the help of the Jewish lobby and also by Turkey's
application on 1 December 1995 for the purchase of 120 ATACMs.
On 12 May 1996, Al-Kifah Al-Arabi, a Syrian weekly publication,
revealed that Turkey was financing 80 percent of a top-secret
joint-production program with Israel aimed at developing medium-range
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; the publication cited
sources in the Syrian secret service. According to Israeli experts,
Turkey's topography is ideal for the carrying out of precise
testing of ballistic missiles, while Israel's land surface is
not.
In October of the same year, the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet
revealed the existence of a secret agreement with China relating
to the direct purchase of a small number [of ballistic missiles]
and, at a later stage, joint production of the WS-1 multiple
rocket launcher system (range 80km). The deal, worth $160 million,
also provided for the transfer of technical know-how for the
construction of ballistic missiles. All the signs are there
that this missile is the [Chinese] M export series, where over
the past three years there have been attempts at improving accuracy
through the application of western technology in the guidance
system.
To this end, a large team of Chinese scientists visited
Turkey in November 1996; they were joined in early 1997 by a
small team of Israeli experts. At least 15 of the Chinese technicians
worked for a considerable period of time at ASELSAN, and specifically
at the department of Micro-electronics, Guidance and Electro-optics
based in Akyurt. The department specializes in laser gyroscopes
and inertial guidance systems. After securing a license from
Litton, since 1998 it has been manufacturing the LN-100G inertial
guidance system that is installed on aircraft and helicopters.
The LN-100G is highly compact, incorporating an INS/GPS
system with three laser gyroscopes and three accelerometers,
thanks to which it achieves an accuracy of up to 10m. Due to
its spine design, it allows for multiple uses. In this case,
it is thought that the cooperation between ASELSAN and the Chinese
with the Israelis is aimed at integrating into the Chinese M
series missiles a state-of-the-art guidance system based on
Litton's technology. In December 1996 an agreement was signed
by Turkey for the purchase of 72 ATACM missiles from the United
States worth $48 million. The purchase was aimed at moderating
US reaction and also at satisfying urgent needs. The first ATACMs
were delivered in September 1998, and the last batch in early
1999.
In 1996 another event transpired, which at first sight seemed
unrelated, but leaves wide room for interpretation. Specifically,
an agreement was signed with a factory in Minsk, Belarus, producing
tracked vehicles; the deal provided for the purchase by the
Turkish army of a large number (perhaps 60) of VOLAT-type carriers.
What is strange in this affair is that these vehicles have also
been manufactured in Turkey for years by Mercedes-Benz Turk
and MANKOS-AS.
Perhaps the explanation is linked to the fact that the same
factory [in Minsk] had from the Soviet era been manufacturing
all specialized Transporter-Erector-Launcher pods for tactical
ballistic missiles of the MAZ-543 series and (8 x and the
MZKT series (12 x 12) used in MRBMs and IRBMs. The highly mobile
MAZ-543 vehicle is to this day considered the best, and continues
to be used for the transport of all known Soviet-made SCUD-B/C
ballistic missiles and modifications, such as the Chinese M-11/DF-11.
It is likely that some modification of this vehicle will form
the launching pod for the missile systems being developed by
Turkey.
On 13 October 1997, during the visit to Ankara of Amnon
Lipkin Shahak, chief of the Israeli armed forces, it became
known that an initial agreement had been reached on joint production
of the Delilah missile, an air-to-surface Cruise missile with
a 500km range. At the same meeting, a decision was also reached
on developing a common system of secure satellite communications.
It is worth noting that, according to an earlier report by Flight
International magazine (1995), China was financing an Israeli
project for the development of an air-launched version of the
Cruise missile based on a Delilah drone. This closes the circle
of the multi-faceted cooperation between the three countries.
In October 1998 the crisis with Syria over the Ocalan affair
broke out. During that crisis the Turkish armed forces deployed
along the border the ATACMs they had just received (a week earlier)
from the United States and also a number of WS-1 systems they
withdrew from the coast of Asia Minor. That was the Turkish
reaction to the threat posed by the 36 SCUD-C missile launchers
deployed by Syria at different points along the Salamyyah highway;
the Syrian launchers had previously been deployed on the border
with Israel. The Israelis gave the Turks the exact location
of the Syrian missiles after tracking them down with the Ofeq
spy satellite.
The crisis was defused with Ocalan's arrest, but it was
later used as an excuse to counter any remaining US reaction.
That brings us to 28 September 1999, the day when the first
test of a missile produced entirely in Turkey was held with
success. The missile, with a weight-at-launch of 150kg and a
range of 60km, was designed by SAGE in cooperation with Chinese
experts; it was manufactured by ROKETSAN and MKEK. It is thought
that it was a test missile used to observe the aerodynamic behavior
of the trunk and the qualitative attributes of the propellant
material.
This was followed on 11 February 2000 by the first successful
test of the long-range TOROS 230-A and TOROS 260-A non-guided
rockets, of a diameter of 230mm and 260mm, respectively. The
rockets were designed by TUBITAK-SAGE and manufactured by MKEK
as part of the "TOROS" top-secret project. For the record, the
non-guided Toros 230A rocket has a 230mm diameter, is 4.1m long,
weighs 326kg, and has a range of 10 to 65km and a target-destruction
radius of 105m. The Toros 260A has a diameter of 260mm, is 4.8m
long, weighs 483kg, and has a range of 15 to 100km and a target-destruction
radius of 150m.
Last December, yet another piece was fitted to the jigsaw
puzzle: the first test launching of a ballistic missile (range
150km) produced entirely in Turkey. In our view, this development
is the most significant in recent years, because it signals
the beginning of a new era distinguished by the toppling of
the delicate balances that obtained to this day. It is further
obvious that the way has been paved for the attainment of Turkey's
strategic objectives, and it is now only a matter of time for
the next step to take place.
According to estimates, within the year there will take
place more tests aimed at certifying the missile before it goes
into mass production. In store for next year should be the first
tests at 300-km ranges. Worse is to come in 2004-2005, when,
barring the unexpected, we will most likely see the first launching
of a 1,000-km range missile, this time poised toward the Mediterranean.
This, coupled with the fact that a recent report by the French
secret service said clearly that in 2006 Turkey will join the
nuclear powers club, makes us raise our arms and pray to...Allah
[as published].
China's M series ballistic missiles
The development of a new series of short and medium-range
missiles aimed at exports began in China in 1984, and the project's
main characteristics were the use of solid-state boosters and
the transport of conventional warheads. The M series family
has four members, known in China as the M-7, M-9, M-11 and the
M-18. The M-7 version originated in a project known as Project
8610, which focused on turning the HQ-2 surface-to-air missile
into a ballistic missile. This is essentially a Chinese copy
of the Soviet SA-2 Guideline missile, a large number of which
China purchased in the late 1950s.
Not long after, the Chinese succeeded in constructing the
first copies (1961-1964), subsequently named the Qi-1 (HQ-1).
There followed an upgraded version, the HQ-2, which came into
service in 1967. In 1985, as part of Project 8610, there began
the development of a new version of the missile designed to
strike at ground targets at a maximum distance of 150km. Later
on this became known as the M-7 or, in NATO terminology, the
CSS-8 Chinese Surface-to-Surface Missile; the first systems
went operational in 1992.
The M-9 is a solid-state fuel propelled missile with a range
of 600km. In the Chinese weapons industry it goes by the code
name DF-15; NATO calls it the CSS-6. Now the M-11 is a Chinese
modification of the Russian SS-1 Scud B; it is a solid-state
fuel propelled missile, totally compatible with the Russian-made
MAZ 543 TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launchers). Only minor modifications
were necessary on the TEL: re-alignment of the support cradle
and the roof of the vehicle so that it can carry missiles of
differing lengths and diameter. So far there has been no corresponding
Russian version of the missile with a solid-state fuel propellant
system, so the Chinese version was designed to compete with
the Russian missiles for the market share. The M-11 has a range
of 300km and is known to Chinese armed forces as the DF-11 (CSS-7).
The fourth and last member of the M family series is the
M-18 missile, which first appeared on display at an air and
naval exhibition in Beijing in 1988. According to experts, this
missile is a lengthened version of the M-9 and is equipped with
a larger two-stage booster. The M-18 was also shown in Iran
in 1991, while reports in 1995 noted plans were under way for
joint development of advanced chemical-gas warheads with Syria,
Iran and possibly North Korea. In 1996 it became known that
Beijing's Institute of Telemetry was working on developing an
improved terminal guidance system for the CSS-6 based on INS/GPS
technology. Evidently, this piece of information coincides with
the time period during which Chinese cooperation with Turkey's
ASELSAN started.
CSS-8 (M-7/Project 8610)
The M-7 (CSS- is a short-range ballistic missile, transported
on a mobile launching pod. It employs solid-state propellants
and carries a single-unit warhead. This missile is a modification
of the SA-2/HQ-2 surface-to-air missile, to be exact the HQ-2B
version that is transported on a tracked vehicle that is modeled
on the Type 63 light combat vehicle). In its default version,
the HQ-2B is a two-stage missile, that is, it has a solid-state
fuel booster for the initial phase and a high-thrust sustainer
with liquid fuel propellants.
In the M-7, the sustainer is replaced by an advanced booster,
thereby forming a two-stage ballistic missile. The missile measures
10.8m long, 0.65m diameter for the first-stage trunk and 0.5m
diameter for the second-stage trunk. Weight-at-launch is 2,650kg.
The missile usually carries a high-explosive (HE) warhead weighing
190kg. Alternatively, it can be fitted with warheads carrying
sub-munitions or chemical weapons. It employs an inertial guidance
system and updated control commands. The rear section of the
sustainer has four moving fins that assist in control during
flight.
The booster is an improved version of the one carried by
the HQ-2 missile; it burns for four seconds and then detaches
from the main body of the missile, which continues on. The sustainer
works for 20 to 30 seconds, giving the M-7 (CSS- a minimum
range of 50km and a maximum range of 150km. It is estimated
that the M-7 became operational in 1992 and, according to some
sources, 90 of these missiles were exported to Iran that same
year. It is also believed that the Chinese were involved in
the North Korea's corresponding project to convert the SA-2
into a ballistic missile. It has further been confirmed that
several other countries, including Iran, Croatia and Serbia,
possess similar missiles; however, it is extremely difficult
to ascertain whether these are exported Chinese M-7s, modified
versions of the SA-2, or copies of the Chinese missile.
CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9)
The M-9 is a medium-range ballistic missile, transported
on a mobile carrier. The missile employs solid-state fuel propulsion
and carries a single-unit warhead. Its length reaches 9.1m,
the trunk's diameter is 1m and its weight-at-launch is 6,200kg.
The missile employs an inertial guidance system incorporating
a digital micro-processor, which allows for fast targeting and
removes the need for wind corrections prior to launch. The Cyclical
Error Probable (CEP) quoted for this missile is around 280m,
suggesting that it is fitted with an integrated terminal guidance
system. Reports indicate that, during separation, the warhead
employs small-sized boosters to correct position before re-entry
into the atmosphere and adjust orbit for the terminal phase.
The trunk has been designed so as to follow the warhead
after separation, thereby confusing and misleading enemy air
defenses. The warhead weighs 500kg, and in the default export
version carries a high explosive (HE) payload. However, the
missiles that are operational in China (described as DF-15s)
can carry a nuclear warhead of 10kT.
There are also reports on the existence of three other different
types of warheads: one with chemical weapons, one with Fuel
Air Explosives (FAE) and one that carries sub-munitions. The
M-9/CSS-6 has a minimum range of 50km and a maximum range of
600km. It is fitted with a single-stage solid-state propellant.
By simply reducing the weight of the warhead to 320kg, the range
can be increased to 800km. Control during launch and initial
acceleration is likely achieved either by diverting gas flow
using adjustable surfaces or through the use of small accuracy
boosters.
The missile is transported on a Tranporter-Erector-Launcher
(TEL) with 8 x 8 drive. Prior to launch, the missile is erected
to vertical position. The highly mobile TEL is poised into offensive
stance and calculates exact target coordinates with the help
of an advanced fire control system, which uses a digital processor
that also features automated auto-control functions prior to
launch, thereby cutting overall preparation time to under 30
minutes. The dimensions and weight of the TEL are almost identical
to those of the Russian-made MAZ 543, and it is believed that
the same launcher pod is used for both the CSS-6 and the CSS-7.
The first test launches for the CSS-6 were held in June
1988 and it is estimated that the missile went operational around
1990. Such missiles have been periodically been acquired by
several countries, including Libya, which in 1989 acquired 140
missiles (80 of which it transferred to Syria). Other countries
include Egypt, Iran and Pakistan. So far there has been no official
confirmation that China has directly exported M-9 missiles.
According to some sources, the M-9's design was used as the
basis for the development of Pakistan's Hatf 3 missile, which
it is thought was designed with Chinese assistance.
Latest reports indicate that the Chinese are now focusing
on equipping the DF-15 with GPS and an inertial navigation system
based on next-generation laser gyroscopes and a high-speed processor
so as to maximize guidance precision during terminal phase and
achieve CEPs as small as 30-45m. all this of course is being
done in cooperation with Turkey and Israel. Given that the missile's
speed exceeds Mach 6, it is practically impossible to intercept
it with conventional air defenses; this makes the missile an
ideal means with which to strike high-value targets well behind
enemy frontlines.
CSS-7 (DF-11/M-11)
The M-11 is a short-range ballistic missile that employs
solid-state fuel propulsion. It is transported on a mobile pod
and carries a single-unit warhead. Very little is known about
this missile, except that its solid-state propulsion system,
external diameter and wiring are similar to that of the SS-1
Scud B missile, which is slightly longer and more heavy.
Experts conjecture that the M-11's warhead separates during
flight and continues its path to the target, controlled by four
small fins fitted on the rear. It is not known whether these
fins (shown in some photographs) are adjustable or else fixed
to further stabilize the flight path. It is believed that control
during the initial launching/acceleration phase is achieved
via either adjustable surfaces located across the jet stream
or small-sized path-correction boosters. The missile is 7.5m
long, has a trunk diameter of 0.88m and the weight-at-launch
is around 5,000kg.
According to initial information provided by the Chinese,
the missile carries a 500-kg warhead and has a maximum range
of 300km. But newer reports say that the missile's warhead weighs
800kg and that the maximum range is 280km. It is considered
highly likely that both versions are correct, and that these
are variations on the ratio of warhead weight to weight of fuel
payload in line with the revised (1999) MTCR treaty regarding
the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles. According to that
treaty, the maximum range should be 300km and the warhead's
weight should not exceed 500kg.
Another version, with a 500-kg warhead and maximum range
of 400km, is believed to be in development for export to Pakistan
and Iran. Initially the M-11 export series carried an HE single-unit
warhead; but the DF-11 version in operation with the Chinese
military carries a 90kT-strong nuclear warhead. Also available
are warheads carrying sub-munitions, chemical weapons and FAEs.
According to another source, the sub-munitions warhead carries
cluster bombs weighing 5kg each.
Reports further indicate that the missile employs a guidance
system during terminal phase that is possibly similar to that
of the M-9 (CSS-6). The M-11 is also thought to be fitted with
boosters located on the rear part of the warhead. The boosters
serve to correct the warhead's position before re-entry to the
atmosphere and to re-adjust flight path. The first test launch
of an M-11 (CSS-7) was held in 1990, and it is likely the missile
went operational in 1992. Unconfirmed reports said that during
tests the new terminal guidance system displayed lesser precision
and a larger CEP (the best performance was a 600m CEP).
According to other estimates, China possesses 200 such missiles
and plans to raise the number to 500 by the year 2005. There
are also reports that some M-11s, or missile parts, have been
sold to Pakistan and Iran, but China denies this. According
to some sources, 34 M-11s were exported to Pakistan in 1993,
but that they are being stored at an airbase near Lahore. There
is also clear evidence of Chinese assistance in the setting
up of infrastructure for the production of ballistic missiles
near Ravalpidi [name as transliterated]. Lastly, reports indicate
that 30 other M-11s, or parts, were exported to Iran in 1995
with the purpose of setting up an assembly line and later on
a full production line.
DF-11/M-18/CSS-7 Mod 2
The M-18 (DF-11 Mod 2) is a modification of the M-11, which
in turn is based on the Russian-made Scud B. It first appeared
on display at a Beijing aerospace exhibition in 1987 as a two-stage
ballistic missile with a maximum range of 1,000km and capability
of carrying warheads weighing 400-500kg. This missile is considerably
longer (by two meters) than all the others of the M series.
According to western observers, the first test launch was held
on 13 March 1996 at the No 2054 missile base in the Hunan district.
Latest reports indicate that Chinese technicians are working
feverishly on the missile designs in a bid to improve accuracy
through the incorporation of a GPS receiver into the guidance
system (probably using the same procedure) [as published]. The
first official appearance of the M-11, dubbed by American analysts
as the CSS-7 Mod 2, came on 1 October 1999. At the same time
period, Pakistan displayed for the first time at a military
parade two Shaheen missiles that bear an uncanny resemblance
to the Chinese CSS-7 Mod 2 (M-1 . This serves to prove beyond
a shadow of a doubt the relation between the two countries'
projects.
Chronicle of Turkey's missile project
1972: foundation of TUBITAK-SAGE
1987: the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United
Kingdom and United States) sign the MTCR treaty imposing restrictions
on the spread of missile technology
1988: ROKETSAN is founded
1988: Turkish cooperation with Pakistan. ASR-227, a top-secret
ballistics missiles development project, gets underway
1989: acquisition of specialized test equipment and telemetry
devices from France
04/1990: first test launch of the ASR-227 missile
1991: recruitment of 200 Turkic-origin scientists from the
former Soviet Union. The scientists were specialized in missile
technology and weapons of mass destruction
1992-1994: beginning of new research at TUBITAK-SAGE and
a shift toward Soviet technology
1995: cooperation starts with China and Israel
1/12/1995: application submitted to United States for the
purchase of 120 ATACMs
1995: transport of a SCUD-B launcher from Afghanistan via
Pakistan
10/1996: revealed: a secret agreement with China on the
purchase of a small number of WS-1 launchers and the transfer
of technical know-how for the construction of ballistic missiles
11/1996: signing of an agreement for the purchase of 72
ATACMs from the United States, worth $48 million
13/10/1997: agreement with Israel on joint production of
the Delilah air-launched Cruise missile
7/10/1997: Ocalan affair triggers Turkish-Syrian crisis;
both sides threaten to use ballistic missiles
28/09/1999: first test launch of a missile produced entirely
in Turkey
11/02/2000: first successful test of the Toros 230-A and
Toros 260-A long-range non-guided rockets
6/12/2001: first test launch of a Turkish-made ballistic
missile of a range of 150km
On ballistic missiles
The term "ballistic missile" describes a missile-propelled
system carrying a weapons payload that has some form of guidance
and is used against ground targets. The attributes of ballistic
missiles make these weapons particularly suitable to carry weapons
of mass destruction, where strike precision comes second to
the capability of infiltrating well behind enemy lines. Depending
on the range, ballistic missiles are classified in four groups:
--Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM), with a range up
to 1,000km (600miles)
--Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM), with a range of
1,100 to 2,750 km (600 to 1,500 miles)
--Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), with a range
of 2,750 to 5,550km (1,500 to 3,000 miles)
--Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), with a range
of over 5,550km
Compared to other weapons-carrying systems, ballistic missiles
are immensely faster than any fighter aircraft, they have shorter
flight times and therefore stand a greater chance of infiltrating
defenses. Ballistic missiles can attack with no notice, making
them an ideal weapon of surprise and preemptive strikes. Their
high speeds in relation to fighter aircraft maximize their chances
of infiltrating and going behind enemy air defenses. They are
extremely difficult to intercept, even for state-of-the-art
guided missiles that are now beginning to be employed and are
consequently limited in numbers.
In contrast to combat aircraft, ballistic missiles do not
require expertly trained or experienced operators (something
which most developing countries lack), operational deployment
is far less costly, nor are large facilities and airports required
for operation. In addition, it is extremely difficult to locate
and destroy ballistic missiles. In the past, the use of such
weapons in inhabited areas had immense psychological effects
on civilians due to random target selection, the faceless nature
of such attacks, the prolonged time periods of waiting for the
next attack and the short warning time of incoming missiles.
Accuracy
Ballistic missiles' accuracy is defined by the term Circular
Error Probable (CEP), and is measured by the arch of a circle
in which at least 50 percent of the missiles are expected to
land. This means that a ballistic missile carrying a conventional
warhead and a CEP of 1km has a minimal chance of destroying
or putting out of action a fixed ground target such as a commend
center or air-defense radar.
Payload
This is not an issue when the missile is fitted with a warhead
carrying a weapon of mass destruction: nuclear, biological or
chemical payloads. In this case, a ballistic missile is capable
of destroying or neutralizing large-sized fixed military targets,
even if the CEP is over 1km. Due to severe limitations imposed
by non-proliferation treaties, a number of countries have turned
to the development of advanced conventional (?) [as published]
warheads of great destructibility, the use of which is not prohibited
by any treaty for the time being. These are warheads carrying
sub-munitions, usually dual-purpose bombs (anti-tank and anti-personnel)
that detonate at the right altitude above a target, causing
damage to a wide area.
In addition, there are anti-personnel and anti-material
warheads, which after detonation spread a large number of shells
(fitted around the payload); lastly, there are Fuel-Air Explosives
(FAE) warheads, which have great destructive power. This kind
of technology (which some have described as the poor man's nuclear
bomb) was in the past acquired by Turkey from Spanish company
EXPAL.
Τουρκικό βαλλιστικό πρόγραμμα
Συντονιστής: Διαχείριση
-
Fantasma337
- Δημοσιεύσεις: 1078
- Εγγραφή: 06 Ιουν 2004, 22:49
- Επικοινωνία:
Άλλη μια γνωστή επιτυχία της Στρατηγικής που μάλιστα έγινε και θέμα στη Βουλή, χωρίς όμως αυτό να γίνει αφορμή να μάθουμε κάτι περισσότερο τα τελευταία 3 χρόνια... Άν το συνδυάσουμε με το πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα των "συμμάχων" μας, τα πράγματα σκουραίνουν επικίνδυνα...
Η Ελληνική "απάντηση" ήταν οι φήμες ότι θ' αγοράζαμε τον "Αλέξανδρο", δηλ. τον βελτιωμένο διάδοχο του "Scud" (μήν ξανακούσω τη λέξη "σκούντ", τον SS-26 από τη Ρωσία, σε περίπτωση που οι Τούρκοι προχωρούσαν περαιτέρω... Σιγά μην αναπτύξουμε τεχνολογία αιχμής, "μπουνταλάδες" είμαστε??? Μητσάρα πιάσε ένα φραπόγαλο...
Η Ελληνική "απάντηση" ήταν οι φήμες ότι θ' αγοράζαμε τον "Αλέξανδρο", δηλ. τον βελτιωμένο διάδοχο του "Scud" (μήν ξανακούσω τη λέξη "σκούντ", τον SS-26 από τη Ρωσία, σε περίπτωση που οι Τούρκοι προχωρούσαν περαιτέρω... Σιγά μην αναπτύξουμε τεχνολογία αιχμής, "μπουνταλάδες" είμαστε??? Μητσάρα πιάσε ένα φραπόγαλο...
