http://www.bobnorris.com/spd.php/spi/sea_stories_6F-16 Community gets slammed (early 1990s)
Μικρό απόσπασμα: "...
To wrap this up, we greatly resent the misguided and faulty comparison of the F-4 Phantom II to the Fighting Falcon, the only fighter aircraft In history to be named after a second-rate college football team. Any resemblance between the McDonnell Douglas Phantom II Supersonic, All-Weather, Fighter-Bomber (Mostly Bomber), and the miserable, single-seat, single-engine, computer designed, fly-by-wire, composite airframe, software-driven, day VFR, ice-FOD sucking, weakdick bubble canopied, target missing, ground impacting, non-hook raising, auto trimming, piddlepack ejecting, G-LOCing piece of flying pork barrel politics is limited to the fact that both aircraft have an F- designation. Your aircraft should have a blue stripe painted around the nose and "FOR TRAINING USE ONLY" stenciled on the fuselage. And you can go to the club tonight knowing that you, your article, and this letter occupy a significant place in our Doofer Book."
Σύγκριση phantom με F-16!
Συντονιστής: Διαχείριση
Σύγκριση phantom με F-16!
Το συγκεκριμένο είναι από τις αρχές τις δεκαετίας του '90. Τρελό γέλιο!
Eχει ενδιαφερον να πατε στο link και να διαβασετε
ολοκληρο το κομματι.
Σε καποιο σημειο λεει:
Kαι πιο κατω αναφερεται στις επιδοσεις
του F-16 στον πρωτο Πολεμο του Κολπου:
ολοκληρο το κομματι.
Σε καποιο σημειο λεει:
εννοωντας το F-18."If any aircraft today approaches the potential for comparison to the F-4, it is another two seat, two engine McDonnell Douglas product in the Air Force Service."
Kαι πιο κατω αναφερεται στις επιδοσεις
του F-16 στον πρωτο Πολεμο του Κολπου:
DemThe simple fact of the matter is that the dismal combat performance of the F-16 in the Gulf War is directly responsible for the continuing service of both the F-4 and the A-10.
The F-16s inability to deliver ordnance load accurately resulted in the need to re-attack targets, endangering men needlessly and wasting resources. It wasn't the F-16 that ran a SAM-killing 8 ship through the most intense air defenses ever encountered by the USAF over Baghdad on the first night of the war. The only reason "Magnum" is even in your vocabulary is because the dwindling numbers of Phantoms led to the conclusion that an F-16 on the wing is better than nothing at all, but only just.
Used as a fighter rather than as an interceptor in Vietnam, the F-4 was severely miscast. Against very inferior North Vietnamese pilots flying small, highly maneuverable MiG-21s, the air-to-air kill ratio sometimes dropped as low as 2 to 1, where it had been 13 to 1 in Korea. As the Vietnam War drew to a close, it was generally agreed that the F-4 had prohibitive deficiencies including:
LARGENESS. F-4 pilots to frequently found themselves fighting at separation distances at which they could not see the smaller MiG-21s, but the MiG-21 pilots could see them.
POOR PILOT VISION. In order to minimize high-speed drag, the F-4, and all combat aircraft before the F-14, does not have a bubble canopy. It is designed for a pilot to look straight ahead. Vision down and to the sides is poor; vision to the rear is nonexistent.
MANEUVERABILITY. While the F-4 can pull 7G in turns, which was acceptable for that time, it can only do so by rapidly bleeding off energy (losing speed and/or altitude).
TRANSIENT PERFORMANCE. Ability of the F-4 to change its maneuver (that is, to roll rapidly while pulling high Gs) was poor.
COST. The large F-4 was an expensive aircraft to procure and maintain. This meant that, compared to the MiG-21, fewer aircraft could be bought with a given budget.
NO GUN. The F-4 was designed without a gun, and was thus not capable of very close combat.
COMBAT PERSISTENCE. While the ferry range of the F-4 was acceptable, its ability to engage in sustained hard maneuvering without running out of fuel was a significant problem.
The F-16 has been, by any standard, a success. USAF has used it heavily and successfully for air-to-ground in the 1991 Gulf war and all subsequent conflicts. The Israeli Air Force has also had great success with it.
FLY BY WIRE has been a clear success. It is now used in essentially all military fixed wing aircraft and on many commercial aircraft.
NEGATIVE STABILITY, or at least reduced positive stability, has worked without a failure - no F-16s have disintegrated in air from control system failure - and is coming into increasing use.
HIGH G LOADS. The 9G standard pioneered by the F-16 is now universal for new fighter designs, although it is achieved more by pilot training than by hardware. Benefit of the 30-degree reclining seat back has not been clearly established, and many pilots find it increases the difficult of checking their six o'clock position while in hard maneuvers. So more recent designs have not copied the F-16 seat. Similarly, the side stick has worked well but has not proven as essential as its designers originally expected. One enduring controversy is whether control systems should, as is the case with the F-16 be programmed to unconditionally limit the aircraft to 9gs, or whether higher loads should be permitted in emergencies. One eminent General Dynamics test pilot, a "super pilot" who in his fifties was still able to sustain 9Gs for 45 seconds, published an article on the subject in "Code One", the General Dynamics house organ, arguing that there was not enough useful benefit in being able to exceed 9 Gs to justify the strain on the airframe, particularly since few pilots could retain functionality above 9Gs. Tragically and ironically, this pilot was killed when his plane, pulling 9Gs in a hard maneuver, was unable to pull up enough to avoid the impacting the ground. This outstanding pilot might have been able to function with a brief application of 10, 11, or even 12Gs. Could that have saved him and his aircraft? Could it save others in the future?
PILOT VISION. Pilots like the F-16 canopy without front bows for its quietness as well as its vision. One drawback is that in order to avoid optical distortion in the bowless design, the conventional use of thick polycarbonate on the front to protect against birdstrike, and thinner polycarbonate for the rest of the canopy, cannot be used. Because the F-16 canopy uses thick polycarbonate throughout, it is not possible to eject by using the seat to puncture through the canopy. The canopy must first be blown off by small rockets, prolonging the ejection sequence slightly. On balance, the F-16 canopy concept is considered successful and it is continued in the F-22. On the other hand, neither Joint Strike Fighter candidate used full-circle vision, much less a bowless canopy.
GROWTH PREVENTION. The original concept of a small day ait-to-air fighter was lost before the first production aircraft. The fuselage was extended so that the single-seat versions became as long as the two-seat version, and air-to-ground capability was added. As its life progressed, the F-16 became progressively larger and heavier as more capability, including the AMRAAM radar-guided missile, chaff and flare dispensers, and more hard points were added. Still, weight gain has been only about half the traditional pound per day, so the determination of the original designers has not been in vain.
COMBAT RADIUS AND PERSISTENCE. The F-16 blended body has worked well, but has not been emulated in most newer designs.
RADAR INTEGRATION. Integration of radar with visual systems has been fully successful and is now standard fighter design.
P.S. Μην ακουω τρελιτσες για το μονο μαχητικο που εκανε πανω απο 4200 πωλησεις +βαλε
Δεν γινεται να εχει αποτυχει στον Gulf εφοσον εχουν πεσει περι τα 5 μονο, απο τη στιγμη που τα 251 αεροσκαφη εκτελεσαν 13.450 εξοδους.
LARGENESS. F-4 pilots to frequently found themselves fighting at separation distances at which they could not see the smaller MiG-21s, but the MiG-21 pilots could see them.
POOR PILOT VISION. In order to minimize high-speed drag, the F-4, and all combat aircraft before the F-14, does not have a bubble canopy. It is designed for a pilot to look straight ahead. Vision down and to the sides is poor; vision to the rear is nonexistent.
MANEUVERABILITY. While the F-4 can pull 7G in turns, which was acceptable for that time, it can only do so by rapidly bleeding off energy (losing speed and/or altitude).
TRANSIENT PERFORMANCE. Ability of the F-4 to change its maneuver (that is, to roll rapidly while pulling high Gs) was poor.
COST. The large F-4 was an expensive aircraft to procure and maintain. This meant that, compared to the MiG-21, fewer aircraft could be bought with a given budget.
NO GUN. The F-4 was designed without a gun, and was thus not capable of very close combat.
COMBAT PERSISTENCE. While the ferry range of the F-4 was acceptable, its ability to engage in sustained hard maneuvering without running out of fuel was a significant problem.
The F-16 has been, by any standard, a success. USAF has used it heavily and successfully for air-to-ground in the 1991 Gulf war and all subsequent conflicts. The Israeli Air Force has also had great success with it.
FLY BY WIRE has been a clear success. It is now used in essentially all military fixed wing aircraft and on many commercial aircraft.
NEGATIVE STABILITY, or at least reduced positive stability, has worked without a failure - no F-16s have disintegrated in air from control system failure - and is coming into increasing use.
HIGH G LOADS. The 9G standard pioneered by the F-16 is now universal for new fighter designs, although it is achieved more by pilot training than by hardware. Benefit of the 30-degree reclining seat back has not been clearly established, and many pilots find it increases the difficult of checking their six o'clock position while in hard maneuvers. So more recent designs have not copied the F-16 seat. Similarly, the side stick has worked well but has not proven as essential as its designers originally expected. One enduring controversy is whether control systems should, as is the case with the F-16 be programmed to unconditionally limit the aircraft to 9gs, or whether higher loads should be permitted in emergencies. One eminent General Dynamics test pilot, a "super pilot" who in his fifties was still able to sustain 9Gs for 45 seconds, published an article on the subject in "Code One", the General Dynamics house organ, arguing that there was not enough useful benefit in being able to exceed 9 Gs to justify the strain on the airframe, particularly since few pilots could retain functionality above 9Gs. Tragically and ironically, this pilot was killed when his plane, pulling 9Gs in a hard maneuver, was unable to pull up enough to avoid the impacting the ground. This outstanding pilot might have been able to function with a brief application of 10, 11, or even 12Gs. Could that have saved him and his aircraft? Could it save others in the future?
PILOT VISION. Pilots like the F-16 canopy without front bows for its quietness as well as its vision. One drawback is that in order to avoid optical distortion in the bowless design, the conventional use of thick polycarbonate on the front to protect against birdstrike, and thinner polycarbonate for the rest of the canopy, cannot be used. Because the F-16 canopy uses thick polycarbonate throughout, it is not possible to eject by using the seat to puncture through the canopy. The canopy must first be blown off by small rockets, prolonging the ejection sequence slightly. On balance, the F-16 canopy concept is considered successful and it is continued in the F-22. On the other hand, neither Joint Strike Fighter candidate used full-circle vision, much less a bowless canopy.
GROWTH PREVENTION. The original concept of a small day ait-to-air fighter was lost before the first production aircraft. The fuselage was extended so that the single-seat versions became as long as the two-seat version, and air-to-ground capability was added. As its life progressed, the F-16 became progressively larger and heavier as more capability, including the AMRAAM radar-guided missile, chaff and flare dispensers, and more hard points were added. Still, weight gain has been only about half the traditional pound per day, so the determination of the original designers has not been in vain.
COMBAT RADIUS AND PERSISTENCE. The F-16 blended body has worked well, but has not been emulated in most newer designs.
RADAR INTEGRATION. Integration of radar with visual systems has been fully successful and is now standard fighter design.
P.S. Μην ακουω τρελιτσες για το μονο μαχητικο που εκανε πανω απο 4200 πωλησεις +βαλε
Δεν γινεται να εχει αποτυχει στον Gulf εφοσον εχουν πεσει περι τα 5 μονο, απο τη στιγμη που τα 251 αεροσκαφη εκτελεσαν 13.450 εξοδους.
Τελευταία επεξεργασία από το μέλος LantirN την 24 Μάιος 2007, 09:56, έχει επεξεργασθεί 1 φορά συνολικά.
The NIGHT is our Business...340M LANTIRN
Έτσι...Να μην ξεχάσουμε κια αυτά που...ξέρουμε!!!